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COERCING PRIVACY 
ANITA L. ALLEN• 
INTRODUCTION 
NUMBER 3 
This Essay advances two propositions about a pair of complex 
ideas that I will call "the liberal conception of privacy" and "the 
liberal conception of private choice ."1  Both ideas will be familiar 
to anyone who has followed the personal privacy debates in the 
United States during the past three decades. 
The liberal conception of privacy is the idea that government 
ought to respect and protect interests in physical, informational, 
and proprietary privacy. 2  By physical privacy, I mean spatial se­
clusion and solitude. By informational privacy, I mean confiden­
tiality, secrecy, data protection, and control over personal infor­
mation. By proprietary privacy, I mean control over names,  like-
* Professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law 
School; Ph.D., University of Michigan. I would like to thank the organizers of the 
conference "Reconstructing Liberalism," sponsored by the Institute of Bill of Rights 
Law and the Department of Philosophy at the College of William and Mary, for in­
viting me to present this paper, and to my former colleagues at the Georgetown 
University Law Center for help with post-symposium revisions. 
1. I put this economical terminology of "privacy" and "private choice" to similar 
use in Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract 
Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461 (1987) .  
2. See id. at 464-66. 
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nesses, and repositories of personal identity.3 The liberal concep­
tion of privacy informs popular understandings of, for example, 
the four invasion of privacy torts, the Fourth and Fifth Amend­
ments of the U.S .  Constitution, state confidentiality statutes, 
federal wiretapping legislation, and proposed genetic privacy 
codes.4  The liberal conception of privacy overlaps considerably 
with the liberal conception of private property. We associate pri­
vacy with certain places and things we believe we own, such as 
our homes, diaries, letters, names ,  reputations, and body parts. 
At the core of the liberal conception of privacy is the notion of 
inaccessibility. Privacy obtains where persons and personal in­
formation are , to a degree, inaccessible to others.5 
The liberal conception of private choice is the idea that gov­
ernment ought to promote interests in decisional privacy, chiefly 
by allowing individuals, families ,  and other nongovernmental 
entities to make many, though not all, of the most important 
decisions concerning friendship ,  sex, marriage, reproduction, 
religion, and political association.6 The liberal conception of pri­
vate choice informs normative understandings of the First 
Amendment and the substantive due process requirements of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The concept of private choice seems to presuppose that social 
life is divided into distinguishable public and private spheres,  
the private sphere being a realm of individual decisionmaking 
about sex, reproduction, marriage, and family. So conceived, "de­
cisional" privacy has origins in classical antiquity. The Greeks 
distinguished the "public" sphere of the polis, or city-state, from 
the "private" sphere of the oikos, or household. 7  The Romans 
3 .  Recently, I have begun to count "proprietary" privacy as a distinct conception 
of privacy, along with physical, informational, and decisional privacy. See Anita L. 
Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS: PRO­
TECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTI.A..LITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31 (Mark A. Rothstein 
ed., 1997) .  
4 .  See Allen, supra note 1 ,  at 464-65 .  
5 .  Cf William C .  Hefferman, Privacy Rights , 29 SUFFOLK U. L .  REV. 737,  740 
( 1 995) ("[P]rivacy rights presuppose a seclusion privilege . . . Seclusion allows for a 
flourishing of difference beyond that which society tolerates in public places because 
it cuts people off from direct contact with the outside world."). 
6. See Allen, supra note 1, at 465-66. 
7. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-78 (1958) (describing Greek 
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similarly distinguished res publicae, concerns of the community, 
from res privatae, concerns of individuals and families.8 The 
public realm was the sector in which free males with property 
whose economic status conveyed citizenship participated in col­
lective governance.9 By contrast, the private realm was the mun­
dane sector of economic and biologic survival.10 Wives, children, 
slaves, and servants populated the private sphere, living as sub­
ordinate ancillaries to male caretakers.n The classical premise 
that social life ought to be organized into public and private 
spheres survives in the post-Enlightenment Western liberal tra­
dition, as does the premise that the private sphere consists 
chiefly of the home, the family, and apolitical intimate associ­
ation. 
Privacy, on the one hand, and private choice, on the other, 
restrain and obligate government. Government must leave us 
alone as a matter of government restraint. Government also 
must protect us from interference and invasion as a matter of 
government obligation. There is a special point to this restraint 
and obligation: where restrained and obligated to advance inter­
ests in privacy and private choice, government is decent and 
tolerant in a way liberals believe moral justice demands. 
Relative to the moral justice liberals demand, privacy and pri­
vate choice are indispensable, foundational goods. Neither priva­
cy nor private choice, however, is an absolute, unqualified good. 
There can be too much privacy, and it can be maldistributed. 
Some liberal feminists take an appropriately skeptical view of 
traditional uses of privacy and private choice to subordinate 
and Roman conceptions of public and private) .  
8 .  Cf JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE 3-4 (Thomas Burger trans . ,  1989) (describing Greek and Roman conceptions 
of public and private). 
9. See ARENDT, supra note 7, at 27-78. 
10. See id. 
11. See Anita L. Allen, Autonomy's Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional In­
terpretation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 683, 688 ( 1992); Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal 
Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Rej1ections on Citizenship, Gender, and the Consti­
tution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL 'y 419, 443 ( 1995) [hereinafter Allen, Proposed 
Equal Protection Fix]. 
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women.12 Likewise, some liberal exponents of law and economics 
take an appropriately skeptical view of traditional uses of priva­
cy to conceal adverse information unreasonably.13 Characteristi­
cally, though, liberals of all stripes proclaim that a degree of 
privacy and private choice is beneficial to individuals and a soci­
ety marked by aspirations for free, democratic, and reasonably 
efficient forms of life.14 
It is no secret that liberals disagree among themselves about 
the rights of privacy and private choice that justice requires. 
Conservative-leaning liberals disagree with liberal-leaning liber­
als about whether government is obligated to permit abortion, 
gay marriage, drug use, and certain other fonns of conduct. 15 
Conservative liberals stress traditional notions of decency and 
propriety along with home and family-centered intimate lives.16 
1 2. See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 
54-56 ( 1988); C atharine A. M acKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93, 1 01-02 (1987)  [hereinafter 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M .  Schneider, Women's Subordina­
tion and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328-55 
(David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1990);  see also Laura W. Stein, Living With the Ri;k of 
Backfire: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of Privacy and Equality, 7 7  MINN. L. 
REV. 1 153, 1 160-70 (1993) (examining feminist critiques of privacy and equality); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101  HARV. L.  REV. 826,  827  ( 1 988)  
(reviewing FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra, and noting that "the d om estic sphere has 
been d evalued and used as a major arena for the subord ination of women"). 
1 3. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55 (2d ed . 1 977). 
14. Cf MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A 
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 94-100 ( 1 996) (arguing that constitutional privacy is rightly val­
ued by l iberals, though for the wrong reasons); James Fleming & Linda M cClain, 
The Right of Privacy in Sandel's Procedural Republic, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY'S 
DISCONTENT 248-59 (Anita L. Allen & M ilton C. Regan, Jr. eds., 1998) (criticizing 
Sandel's attack on traditional liberal accounts of the value of p rivacy). 
15 .  See, e.g., Leon E. Trak.Tilan & Sean Gatier, Abortion Rights: Taking Responsi­
bilities More Seriously than Dworkin, 48 SMU L. REV. 585, 592 ( 1995); Mark V. 
Tushnet, Sex, Drugs, and Rock 'n' Roll: Some Conservative Reflections on Liberal 
Jurisprudence, 82 COLUl'vl. L. REV . 1531, 1536-39, 1542-43 ( 1982) (book review) ; Robin 
West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the Problem of Gay Marriage, 25 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 705, 7 1 1, 726-30 ( 1998).  
16.  See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Liberal Egalitarianism and Civic Republicanism: 
Friends or Enemies, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT, supra note 14,  at 131, 
1 32-48 (distinguishing conservative or "right-wing" liberals from l iberal or "left-wing" 
II 
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Liberal liberals stress the importance of tolerating nonconformi­
ty and responsible departures from traditional modes of private 
life.17 All liberals agree, though, with a general principle of sub­
stantial government restraint with respect to broad dimensions 
of personal life.18 Subscription to this rough principle of public 
and private is one of the ties that bind competing versions of 
liberalism. 
The impossible ideal of a private sphere free of government 
and other outside interference has currency despite the reality 
that, in the United States and other Western democracies, virtu­
ally every aspect of nominally private life is a focus of direct or 
indirect government regulation. Marriage is considered a private 
relationship, yet governments require licenses and medical 
tests/9 impose age limits,20 and prohibit polygamous,21 incestu­
ous,22 and same-sex marriages.23 Procreation and childrearing 
are considered private, but government child abuse and neglect 
laws24 regulate how parents must exercise their responsibilities. 
The liberal ideal of a private sphere can be no more than an ide­
al of ordinary people, living under conditions of democratic self­
government, empowered to make choices about their own lives 
that are relatively free of the most direct forms of governmental 
interference and constraint. 
The first proposition that I will advance against the preceding 
background is this: although the liberal conception of private 
choice is flourishing, as evidenced by the growing acceptability 
of homosexual unions25 and abortion rights,26 the liberal concep-
liberals, and identifying the respects in which both are liberal). 
17. See id. at 132-34. 
18. See id.; see also SANDEL, supra note 14, at 4-5 (defining liberalism). 
19. See, e.g. , CONN. GSN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-24 (West 1997);  GA. CODE ANN. § 19-
3-40 (Harrison 1991). 
20. See, e.g. , MICH. COMP. LAWS A."'N .  § 551.103 (West 1998). 
21. See, e.g. , CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-190. 
22. See, e.g. , id. § 53a-191. 
23. See, e.g., LA. C!V. CODE A.'IN. art. 89 (West 1997). 
24. See, e .g. , TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-401 (1997). 
25. See, e.g., Baehr v .  Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61 (Haw. 1993) (holding that a denial 
of marriage license to homosexual couples constitutes sex-based discrimination); 
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tion of privacy is not flourishing similarly. One detects signs of 
an erosion of the taste for and expectation of privacy. Neither 
individuals, institutions, nor government consistently demand or 
respect physical, informational, and proprietary privacy. Liber­
als may need to rethink the claims they have always made 
about the value of privacy. We are forced to be free. Liberal gov­
ernments cannot permit us to sell ourselves into slavery. Are we 
forced to be private? Should we be? Should liberals urge govern­
ment to force people to be modest, keep sexual and family mat­
ters confidential, get off of mailing lists, install caller-ID block­
ers, and sanitize their memoirs? 
The second proposition that I will advance relates to the first: 
traditional liberal conceptions of privacy and private choice have 
survived appropriately strenuous feminist critique, re-emerging 
in beneficially reconstructed forms.27 As a result of the feminist 
critique, we understand that the conditions of confinement, 
forced modesty, obedience, and unaccountability that once con-­
stituted the private sphere are not a model of privacy worthy of 
the name. Ironically, just when meaningful, unoppressive forms 
of privacy and private choice are becoming imaginable and avail­
able to women,28 privacy is losing its cache. 
What good are the ideals of physical, informational, and pro­
prietary privacy that survive feminist critique if no one sub­
scribes to them? Everyone should want privacy, for reasons lib­
eral moralists have stated, and for other reasons relating to re­
sponsibility and participation that they have tended to overlook. 
What if, however, some people do not want privacy? "Coercing 
RICHARD A POSNER, SEX AL'<D REASON 202 n.38 (1992) (noting a 1989 Gallup poll in 
which 47% of respondents favored legalizing homosexual relations, up from 43% in 
1977); Mireya Navarro, 2 Decades Later, Miami Passes Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
2, 1998, at A1; cf Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, 689 A2d 828, 831 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (surveying public and private-sector trends in the 
acceptance of domestic partnerships). 
26. See David J. Garrow, No End is in Sight for Abortion Battle ,  NEWSDAY (NY.), 
Jan. 20, 1998, at A31, available in 1998 WL 2655066 (noting "increased public sup­
port for early abortions"). 
27. See supra notes 12-14. 
28. See Allen, supra note 1, at 4 70-77. 
• 
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privacy"-imposing privacy norms to make sure everyone lives 
in accordance with a particular vision of privacy-would be prob­
lematic. That kind of intolerant moralism is part of the problem 
with the military's "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy respecting gay 
service members; that kind of intolerant moralism was part of 
the problem with the cult of domesticity. Nonetheless, I suggest 
that imposing privacy norms to undergird the liberal vision of 
moral freedom and independence is generally consistent both 
with liberalism and with the egalitarian aspirations of feminism. 
I. TECHNOLOGY AND THE T.AJ3LOIDS 
The final decades of the twentieth century could be remem­
bered for the rapid erosion of expectations of personal privacy 
and of the taste for personal privacy in the United States. Re­
cent polling data as well as high profile litigation and policy de­
bates suggest impressively high levels of concern about physical 
and informational privacy.29 Certain legal and policy trends; cer­
tain modes of market, consumer, and political behavior; and cer­
tain dimensions of popular culture, though, suggest low levels of 
concern.30 I sense that people expect increasingly little physical, 
29. See Marc Rotenberg, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC): Privacy 
Surveys, (visited Sept. 9, 1996) <http://www .epic.org/privacy/survey>. Professor Marc 
Rotenberg, Adjunct Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center in 
Washington, D.C.,  heads EPIC and maintains its excellent website. Well-respected 
privacy surveys include Professor Alan F. Westin's periodic surveys for Privacy & 
American Business, and the Equifax/Harris Consumer Privacy Surveys by Louis H ar­
ris and Associates, who also sometimes collaborate with Professor Alan Westin. See 
Louis Harris & Associates, The 1996 Equifax-Harris Consumer Privacy Survey (Oct. 
8, 1996). According to Professor Rotenberg, the Georgia Tech Graphics, Visualization 
& Usability Center World Wide Web Survey ("GVU \VVfW Survey") is the most 
comprehensive poll of web users. See, e.g., Graphics, Visualization & Usability Cen­
ter, GVU's 8th WWW User Survey (visited Oct. 30, 1 998) <http://www.gvu.gatech. 
edu/user_surveys/survey-1997-10>; see also Dr. Alan F. Westin and Danielle Maurici, 
E-commerce and Privacy: What Net Users Want, Survey Report (June 1998). 
30. See Eric Fisher, Stores Find Value in Tracking Buys; Privacy Group Questions 
Practice, WASH. TIMES, June 15, 1998, at D 1 4, available in 1998 WL 3450474 (not­
ing grocery store's practice of tracking consumer purchase patterns using a magne­
tized "loyalty program" membership card, and noting "strong consumer popularity for 
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informational, and proprietary privacy, and that people seem to 
prefer less of these types of privacy relative to other goods. 
An erosion of privacy-related tastes and expectations could 
have numerous causes. These causes could include an avalanche 
of technologies that make it easy and advantageous for us to 
make ourselves available to others (e.g., cellular phones, fax ma­
chines, e-mail); easy and advantageous for our government to 
keep track of us (e.g., video surveillance of urban streets, data­
banking, testing); and easy and advantageous for the corporate 
sector to collect and exchange personal information about us 
(e.g., phone surveys, data-banking, mailing lists). Technologists 
hope that someday soon we may be wearing computers capable 
of transmitting data around the world, as casually as we wear 
eyeglasses and wristwatches.31 
Another cause of erosion in privacy-related tastes and expec­
tations could be an avalanche of two related kinds of opportuni­
ties. First, opportunities to earn money and celebrity by giving 
up privacy voluntarily, and second, opportunities to consume 
other people's privacy and private lives on the cheap: $1.50 for a 
magazine or tabloid; $19.95 for access to the Internet. Opportu­
nities to earn money and celebrity include opportunities to write 
books, to sell personal information to publishers, and to appear 
on sensational television programs designed to expose shocking 
intimacies. Only now, the intimacies that once were shocking 
when exposed are merely titillating. Opportunities to consume 
other people's privacy include the purchase of magazines and 
newspapers containing personality profiles, or spending time on 
loyalty programs" despite the resulting invasion of privacy); Sarah Ann Nelson, 
Internet Traders Swap Beanies-and Trust , USA TODAY, July 20, 1998, at 15A, 
available in 1 998 WL 5730887 (noting the thriving Internet trade in the popular 
Beanie Babies with minimal concerns about privacy). 
31. Approximately two hundred such technologists participated in the Second In­
ternational Symposium on Wearable Computers, held October 19-20, 1998, in Pitts­
burgh, Pennsylvania, which profiled new and emerging wearable computing technolo­
gy. The event was sponsored by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
Computer Society. See Wearables: Out in the World (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http:// 
wwv.;.media.mit.edu!wearables/out-in -the-world>. 
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the Internet during which one can view records containing per­
sonal financial information about others. One can even watch 
strangers on-line in real time as they groom themselves and in­
teract with their intimates. 
With regard to the latter, I am alluding to the young woman 
named Jenni who first garnered national attention last year for 
creating the JenniCam website, from which paying customers 
can watch her live out her life.32 Jenni trains a video camera on 
a spot in her bedroom.33 For a few dollars, one can watch her do 
many of the things adults ordinarily do in the privacy of their 
apartments.34 The SaraCam project, launched and discontinued 
by station Bravo in 1998, offered live pictures-twenty-four 
hours a day-from the bedroom of another young woman, Sara.35 
In absolute terms, the number of us willing to sell privacy may 
be small, but the number of us who want to buy others' privacy 
is large enough to insure that entrepreneurs will make private 
facts available in the market in any number of attractive forms. 
32. See JenniCam (visited Dec. 1, 1 998) <http://www.jennicam.org>. 
33. See id.; see also Rosa Prince, Sara Draws Back the Curtains for All, THE IN­
DEPENDENT (London), Feb. 3, 1998, at 2 ("Fans of the Internet site JennCam [sic], 
featuring 24-hour live pictures from inside an American woman's bedroom, can now 
tune into a British version-SaraCam."). 
34. As of December 1998, Jenni charged $15 per year for "membership." See 
JenniCam: Frequently Asked Questions (visited Dec. 1 ,  1998) <http://www.jennicam. 
org/faq/membership.htmb. Many features of the site, however, are accessible free of 
charge. 
35. See Bravo Girlcam (visited Sept. 28, 1 998) <http://www.bravo.co.uklhtml/ 
girlcam.htmi> (discontinued); see also Prince, supra note 33, at 2 .  Prince writes: 
Viewers of the Internet station Bravo were invited to vote for a British 
Jenny [sic] from a short-list of three young women. . . . [A spokesman] 
for Bravo[] denied SaraCam's audience would be dominated by dirty old 
men. "It'll be more like a real soap opera," he said. "Sara has a great 
personality and she's bound to be throwing loads of parties. On the other 
hand there will probably be quite a lot of time when all you will be able 
to see is Sara's cat asleep on her bed or Sara brushing her hair." . . .  
The camera can be turned off or moved away if Sara wants a little pri­
vacy. And while the self-confessed show-off said . she is  unshockable, 
it is understood no nudity will be involved. 
!d. Visitors to Sara's site will now discover that she has, in her own words, "mutat­
ed into your friendly agony aunt, Staff Nurse Gertie," complete with a new web 
page. 
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The question these developments raise for me is whether some­
one ought to do something to stop the erosion of expectations 
and tastes. 
The conjecture that the taste for privacy and the expectation 
of privacy are eroding is consistent with the observation I have 
made elsewhere that privacy norms play an expansive role in 
morals, politics, and law.36 Privacy is not dead. In morals, 
though with significant cultural variations, expectations of, and 
mutual respect for, the privacy of certain places, communica­
tions, and behaviors constrain daily intercourse. In politics, par­
ticularly in Western-style democracies, privacy stands virtually 
on a par with liberty and equality as a core liberal value.37 Pri­
vacy as a political value, however, is not limited to liberal 
thought or liberal regimes. People around the world consider 
protecting at least some privacy interests a core function of good 
government.38 In law, virtually every country's written constitu­
tion or comparable basic law contains privacy principles limiting 
authorized government access to people and their possessions.39 
The civil law of individual Western European nations and the 
official directives of the European Community include broad pri­
vacy protection regulating the disclosure of personal and com­
mercial information.40 
36. See Anita L. Allen, Constitutional Law and Privacy, in A COMPANION TO PHI­
LOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 139-55 (Dennis Patterson ed. ,  1996) (expanding 
and supporting above assertions regarding the expansive role of privacy in l aw ,  m or­
als,  and politics); Anita L. Allen, The Jurispolitics of Privacy, in RECONSTRUCTING 
POLITICAL THEORY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 68-84 (Mary Lyndon Shanley & Uma 
Marayan eds., 1997) [hereinafter Allen, The Jurispolitics of Privacy] (examining con­
ventional understanding of privacy rights). 
37. See Allen, The Jurispolitics of Privacy, supra note 36, at 68. 
38. See, e.g. , Common Position (EC) Adopted by the Council on February 20, 1995 
with a View to Adopting Directive 94, 80 IOWA L. REV. 697 app. at 698-700, 704, 
711 (1995) [hereinafter Common Position]; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitution­
alism and International Organizations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 398, 433-34 
(1996). 
39. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 10-17 (1994); Michelle Lynn M cClure, An Analysis of the New Russian 
Constitution, 4 J. lNT'L L. & PRAC. 601, 609-11 (1995) 
40. See, e.g., C ouncil of Europe-Organisation for Economic C o-operation and Devel-
II 
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Privacy as a legal norm is especially pervasive in the United 
States. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amend­
ments of the U.S. Constitution implicitly guarantee rights of pri­
vacy.41 Statutes and the common law create additional rights of 
privacy for American victims of unwanted intrusion, publicity, 
and breaches of confidentiality.42 Americans now have an array 
of positive privacy rights to physical seclusion and limited pub­
licity under the common law, the Constitution, and various stat­
utes, and constitutional rights to a government that is supposed 
to leave people alone to make a range of decisions in peace and 
with relative autonomy.43 I could be wrong about an erosion in 
privacy-related tastes and expectations. The popularity of anony­
mous and encrypted communication on the Internet could be 
evidence that technology has not worn away the taste for priva­
cy. Let us suppose arguendo, however, that the conjectured ero­
sion is real. Should we do something about it? Should govern­
ment? Should industry? Should consumers? If we wanted to stop 
the erosion, how could we? One way to address the erosion 
would be to stop the avalanche of technology and commercial 
opportunity responsible for the erosion. We could stop the ava­
lanche of technology, but we will not, if the past is any indica­
tion. In the United States, with a few exceptions like govern­
ment-funded human cloning and fetal tissue research, the rule is 
that technology marches on.44 
We could stop the avalanche of commercial opportunity by 
intervening in the market for privacy; that is, we could (some 
opment: Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, opened for 
signature Jan. 25, 1 988, 27 I.L . M. 1 160, 1 16 1 ;  Common Position, supra note 38 .  
41. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,  484 ( 1965). 
42. See, e.g. , Lilliam R. BeVier, Information About Indiuiduals in the Hands of 
Gouernment: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Priuacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 455 (1995); David W. Melville & Harvey S. Perlman, Protection for 
Works of Authorship Through the Law of Unfair Competition: Right of Publicity and 
Common Law Copyright Reconsidered, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J .  363 (1998). 
43. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.  Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852, 884 ( 1 992) (noting 
"the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy"). 
44. See Mark W. Davis, Fetal Tissue Transplants: Restricting Recipient Designa­
tion, 39 HASTINGS L .J. 1079, 1079-90 (1988). 
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way or another) increase the costs of consuming other people's 
privacy and lower the profits of voluntarily giving up one's own 
privacy. The problem with this suggested strategy is that, even 
without the details of implementation, it raises the specter of 
censorship, repression, paternalism, and bureaucracy. Privacy is 
something we think people are supposed to want; if it turns out 
that they do not, perhaps third parties should not force it on 
them, decreasing both their utility and that of those who enjoy 
disclosure, revelation, and exposure. 
Of course, we force privacy on people all the time. Our elected 
officials criminalize public nudity, even to the point of discourag­
ing breastfeeding.45 Prison authorities throw felons into solitary 
confinement. Parents punish children by consigning them to 
"time outs" in isolated corners of their homes. It is one thing, 
the argument might go, to force privacy on someone by 
criminalizing nude sun-bathing and topless dancing. These ac­
tivities have pernicious third-party effects and attract vice. It 
would be wrong, the argument might continue, to force privacy 
on someone, in the absence of harm to others, solely on the 
grounds that one ought not say too much about one's thoughts, 
feelings, and experiences; one ought not reveal in detail how one 
spends one's time at home; and one ought not live constantly on 
display. Paternalistic laws against extremes of factual and phys­
ical self-revelation seem utterly inconsistent with liberal self-ex­
pression, and yet such laws are suggested by the strong claims lib­
eral theorists make about the value of privacy. Liberal theorists 
claim that we need privacy to be persons, independent thinkers, 
free political actors, and citizens of a tolerant democracy.46 
Walling off the avalanche of technology and commercial oppor­
tunity via regulation and prohibition may be violative of liberal, 
libertarian, and market values. Halting the erosion without bu­
reaucracy and coercion may be a more promising route. Here the 
45. See, e.g., Durmeriss Gruver-Smith, Note, Protecting Public Breast-Feeding in 
Theory But Not in Practice, 19 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 167 (1998). 
46. Cf Robin West, Tak ing Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 44-45 (1990) 
(arguing that "the traditional l iberal faith in the individual is somewhat misplaced"). 
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focus should be on strengthening individuals to stand up to 
the avalanche: empower fellow-citizens-through preaching and 
teaching-to hold on to their own privacy and to consume less of 
others'. This alternative approach-strengthening the moral 
foundation of the community-simply may be too difficult. The 
market for private facts not only feeds the taste for consuming 
the privacy of others; it simultaneously constructs such tastes. 
The teacher and the preacher must compete with market and 
marketing forces that also are teaching and preaching that 
Americans should tell all, sell all, and know all. Certain seg­
ments of the market may be at work in ways consistent with 
improving individual moral fiber. The market has brought us 
products such as caller-ID blockers and cryptography programs 
that make us more able to conceal from others who we are and 
what we think. My sense, though, is that technology-assisted 
accessibility is more alluring than old fashioned inaccessibility. 
The picture I am painting of the demise of privacy expecta­
tions and preferences may sound gloomy, but it is only as 
gloomy as privacy is important in ways that matter. If privacy 
were not important, it would make no difference that people are 
more willing to give up privacy than they used to be. It would 
make no difference that people are even more attracted to gossip 
and intimate facts about others than they used to be. It would 
make no difference if technology has made willingness to give up 
privacy more profitable and the appetite for others' private lives 
more easily fed. 
II. PRIVACY AS INDISPENSABLE AND FOUNDATIONAL 
Some people complain bitterly about privacy invasions in envi­
ronments such as the workplace.47 People are shocked to learn 
about the "cookies" they leave as they traverse the Internet.48 
47. See Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail 
Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345, 345-50 
( 1 995). 
48. For a broad overview of the informational privacy issues raised by the use of 
the Internet, see TECHNOLOGY AND PR.lVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE (Philip E. Agre & 
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Bioethicists focus on the privacy implications of genetics and 
HIV testing.49 Legislatures enact privacy laws.50 Privacy commis­
sions and task forces convene regularly. 51 Some people really care 
about privacy; my point, however, is that many people do not. 
The group that does not care much about privacy may consist 
of individuals who share some things in common. The regard 
one has for privacy or particular forms of privacy may be partly 
a function of one's generation, educational background, and 
wealth. An upper middle-class person can afford to care about 
the privacy of her body. She does not need to take a job as a 
stripper, whereas a poor, uneducated person might. Generation­
al differences in the taste for privacy may be significant in the 
United States, as younger Americans appear to be learning to 
live reasonably well and happily without privacy. Young adults 
seem to take exposure for granted and many understand that 
they live in virtual glass houses. Anyone with sophistication 
about the Internet or the credit and insurance industries knows 
that it is easy and cheap to find out facts about friends, neigh­
bors, and strangers.52 I may not be able to walk into your bed­
room, but I can find out how much you earn, where you work, 
your Social Security number, and how much you paid for your 
house. Young adults today understand that their medical re­
cords are not seen solely by their doctors, and that cameras 
posted in workplaces, at ATM machines, and on the public 
streets monitor their conduct. They know about the night detec­
tion devices and hyperbolic microphones that enable others to 
see and hear inside their homes.53 
Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY]. 
49. See Kristin M. Raffone, The Human Genome Project: Genetic Screening & the 
Fundamental Right of Privacy, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 503, 519-22, 544 (1997). 
50. See, e .g. , The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994) (regulating disclo­
sure of records); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 
1232g (1994) (regulating disclosure of educational records). 
51. See generally Robert M. Gellman, Can Privacy Be Regulated Effectively on a 
National Le ve/2 Thoughts on the Possible Need for International Privacy Rules. 41 
VILL. L. REV. 129, 134 (1996) (noting establishment of the Privacy Protection Study 
Commission in 1974). 
52. See TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY, supra note 48, at 17. 
53. Furthering the popularity of such technology, night detection devices are mar-
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My one-time University of Michigan classmate, the entertain­
ment mogul Madonna, symbolizes some of the generational dif­
ferences to which I am referring. Early in her career, she re­
sponded cleverly to outmoded privacy conventions by flouting 
them. She deconstructed female modesty by wearing her under­
wear as outerwear and by turning her sexual fantasies into 
songs and coffee table books. She capitalized on eroded tastes 
and expectations of privacy by turning herself and everyone 
around her into mass media stars.54 Her commercially successful 
full-length feature film Truth or Dare took us on an intimate 
tour of her personal and professional life. 55 The message was 
that happiness and success do not require privacy; indeed, they 
are antithetical to privacy. 
For people under forty-five who understand that they do not, 
and cannot, expect to have many secrets, informational privacy 
may now seem less important. As a culture, we seem to be 
learning how to be happy and productive--even spiritual­
knowing that we are like open books, our houses made of glass. 
Our parents may appear on the television shows of Oprah 
Winfrey or Jerry Springer to discuss incest, homosexuality, mis­
cegenation, adultery, transvestitism, and cruelty in the family. 
Our adopted children may go on television to be reunited with 
their birth parents. Our law students may compete with their 
peers for a spot on the MTV program The Real World, and a 
chance to live with television cameras for months on end and be 
viewed by mass audiences. Our ten-year-olds may aspire to have 
their summer camp experiences-snits, fights, fun, and all­
chronicled by camera crews and broadcast as entertainment for 
others on the Disney Channel. 
Should we worry about any of this? What values are at stake? 
Scholars and other commentators associate privacy with several 
keted by popular firms, including the upscale chain Sharper Image. See Tech Today: 
Help Seeing in the Dark, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Dec. 18, 1 997, at 
13E, available in 1997 WL 7594235. 
54. See generally Ingrid Sischy, Madonna and Child, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 1998, at 
206 (noting Madonna's artistic career, business enterprises, and lifestyle). 
55. See TRUTH OR DARE (Miramax 1991) .  
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important clusters of value. Privacy has value relative to norma­
tive conceptions of spiritual personality, political freedom, health 
and welfare,  human dignity, and autonomy. In 1890, E.L. 
Godkin published a magazine article defending privacy for its 
supposed "spiritual" value.56 His quaint, elite-sounding tone and 
theme were echoed in the famous law review article published 
later the same year by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis .57 
For all three men, the photographic and printing technologies 
developed in their day threatened the privacy of home and fami­
ly.58 They believed that private homes and families were essen­
tial for the spiritual well-being of civilized men.59 In 1905, the 
Georgia Supreme Court, in Pavesich v. New England Life Insur­
ance Co., became the first court expressly to affirm the existence 
of a legal right to privacy.60 In Pavesich, the emphasis was not 
on spiritual man, but political man, as the court made the case 
for privacy in political terms. The court reasoned that the social 
contract surely must have a provision guaranteeing the protec­
tion of privacy.61 If not, what citizen would agree to the soci al 
contract? The Georgia court's argument presupposed that it is 
rational and natural to desire control over one's personal like­
ness and identity.62 
Psychologists have long emphasized the unhealthy effects of 
depriving individuals of opportunities for socially defined modes 
of privacy. In the 1970s and 1980s, social psychologists argued 
56. See E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, JV.-To His Own Reputation, 
SCRIBNER'S, July 1890, at 58, 65-66. Godwin wrote: 
!d. 
Personal dignity is the fine flower of civilization, and the more of it 
there is in a community, the better off the community is ...  But with-
out privacy its cultivation or preservation is hardly possible . . . .  [News-
paper journalism] has converted curiosity into what economists call an ef­
fectual demand, and gossip into a marketable commodity. 
57. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
58. See id. at 195. 
59. See id. at 193-94. 
60. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S .E. 68, 69-70 (Ga. 1905). 
61. See id. at 69. 
62. See id. 
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that opportunities for physical and informational privacy were 
important to mental well-being and social exchange .63 Physical 
and informational privacy practices serve to limit observation 
and disclosure that are inimical to the well-being. Philosophers 
and legal theorists began urging in the 1970s that the great 
growth of privacy rights in tort law, the constitutional right to 
privacy, and state and federal privacy statutes serve the inter­
ests of human dignity and autonomy.64 
Liberals explain the value of privacy and private choice in 
relation to their consequences for individuals and society, as 
well as in relation to dignitarian and deontic ends. Liberal moral 
philosophers maintain that respecting the many forms of privacy 
is paramount to respect for human dignity, personhood, moral 
autonomy, workable community life ,  and tolerant democratic 
political and legal institutions .65 In a memorable essay, philoso­
pher Jeffrey Reiman once closely linked privacy to the formation 
of individual personhood: " [p]rivacy is a social ritual by means of 
which an individual's moral title to his existence is conferred."66 
Some theorists wrongly condemn privacy when privacy is con­
strued in Reiman's terms .67 So construed, privacy can seem to 
serve the interests of selfishness or an exaggerated individual­
ism. The formation of self-concept and intimate relationships on 
which workable family and community life depend, however, 
requires opportunities for privacy and private choice. Privacy is 
down time. Privacy allows me to rest, retool, and as a result, 
better prepare myself for my social responsibilities,  whether 
they be familial, local, or global . Privacy has value as the con-
63. See, e.g., CARL D. SCHNEIDER, S HAME, EXPOSURE AND PRIVACY (1977). 
64. See, e .g., PHILOSOPH ICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY (Ferdinand 
David Schoeman ed., 1 984); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Privacy: Mor­
al Ideals in the Constitution?,  58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445 (1983). 
65. See, e .g. , Jeffrey H .  Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 26 (1976). 
66. ld. at 39.  
67. See, e.g., William A. Parent, Privacy: A Brief Survey of the Conceptual Land­
scape, 1 1  SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 21, 22 (1995) (rejecting 
Reiman's definition of privacy). 
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text in which individuals work to make themselves better 
equipped for their famili al ,  professional, and political roles . With 
privacy, I can try to become competent to perform and achieve 
up to my capacities, as well as to try out new ideas and practice 
developing skills. 
To speak of "coercing" privacy is to call attention to privacy as 
a foundation, a precondition of a liberal egalitarian society. Pri­
vacy is not an optional good, like a second home o r  an invest­
ment account. The argument of this Essay is structurally identi­
cal to an argument philosopher Samuel Freeman makes about 
drug policy.68 It would be illiberal to criminalize addictive recre­
ational drugs in the absence of good evidence of substantial neg­
ative externalities, were clear-headed cognitive capacity not a 
requirement of responsible participation in a liberal democratic 
government.69 Similarly, it would be illiberal to coerce privacy 
were something approaching the ideal of morally autonomous 
selves not a requirement of participation in a liberal democratic 
society. 
A hard task seems to lay before us-namely, deciding which 
forms of privacy are so critical that they should become matters 
of coercion. The task is especially hard because we cannot fairly 
rely solely and uncritically on traditional notions of modesty and 
civility. Responding to the erosion of privacy tastes and expecta­
tions is not j ust a matter of outlawing nudity on the Internet or 
demanding standards for broadcasters and publishers that limit 
the number of confessional television shows and publications. No 
one is rendered unfit for life in a liberal democracy because he 
or she posed nude or appeared once on Jerry Springer or Oprah .  
Yet numerous little consensual and nonconsensual privacy loss­
es, too trivial to protest individually, aggregate into a large pri­
vacy loss that is a detriment to the liberal way of life .  It is this 
aggregation problem of cumulative accessibility and accountabil­
ity to others that policymakers should begin to try to address . 
68. See Samuel Freeman, Liberalism, Inalienability, and Rights of Drug Use, in 
DRUGS AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM 118 (Pablo De Greiff ed. ,  1999).  
69.  See id. at 124-25. 
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This policymaking task should be guided by a consideration of 
the cumulative effect of living without "down time" in a seclu­
sion-deficient, access-compulsive world. We live in busy house­
holds, with partners, children, and parents who have complete 
access to us; we walk down busy streets where we are observed 
and approached by others, and where video cameras may track 
our moves to deter crime; law enforcers observe and monitor our 
automobile driving; employers ask for blood and urine samples, 
and request psychological testing; our supervisors and co-work­
ers may read our mail and e-mail, and listen in on our telephone 
calls; we make purchases from retailers who bank information 
about us, sell it to others, and are subject to subpoenas; we trav­
el with cellular phones, beepers, and laptops, and our portable 
phone conversations can be intercepted by third parties. Ap­
proaches to coercing privacy should take all of this experiential 
reality into account while avoiding the easy assumption, at­
tacked by feminist theory, that social elites know exactly what 
kinds of privacy and private lives are appropriate for everyone.70 
III. FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTION 
Thirty years ago, the prevailing liberal visions of privacy and 
private choice were in desperate need of re-thinking. The then­
prevailing visions have now been re-thought: Scholars and activ­
ists have undertaken "deconstruction," "revisioning," and "recon­
struction" of old notions of privacy and private choice with much 
success. Scholars now think differently about private life and 
private lives. Historians, social scientists, and jurisprudes have 
joined forces to discredit the myth that the home is a haven.7 1  
70 .  S e e  generally Linda C .  McClain, Inviability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanc­
tuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195,  208-09 (1995)  (asserting that criti­
cal examination of privacy protection and public/private distinctions "have been a 
significant component of feminist jurisprudence. [Such critiques] target not only the 
legai treatment of privacy, but also an array of beliefs and social practices about 
privacy and the private sphere, and the ways in which they construct and constrain 
women's lives."). 
7 1. See id. at 209 (citing CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY 
OF THE STATE 193 ( 1 989)) .  
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As a result, we have at our disposal the intellectual tools to look 
realistically and critically at the quality of life in households and 
families.  We understand now that the nominally private sphere 
may not provide meaningful opportunities for privacy and pri­
vate choice to certain people and groups . 
Liberal philosophers (other than liberal feminists) have tend­
ed to overlook the risks of harm that privacy poses. These risks, 
however, must be factored into any complete ethical analysis of 
privacy. Feminists have demonstrated that the private sphere of 
home and family is a site of peril and subordination.72 Feminists 
claim that privacy facilitates subordination and shields violence 
against spouses, children, and the elderly.73 If what feminists 
say is true, it might seem to follow that one ought not l ament 
the apparent demise of privacy-related tastes and expectations . I 
believe a different conclusion is warranted.  
The concept of privacy has been central to the feminist 
critiques of Western liberal societies. Feminist scholars have 
been in the forefront of liberal , progressive, and communitarian 
efforts to debunk and rebuild liberal understandings of privacy 
and private choice.74 Many feminists explicate privacy-con­
strued primarily as the private sphere of home and family 
life-as the problematic context of traditional female subordina­
tion and isolation in subservient, dependent socio-economic 
roles.75 They argue on good evidence that violence and neglect 
can befall vulnerable individuals in any area of domestic or com­
mercial life when a community or its government abrogates re­
sponsibility to citizens and enterprises tagged "private ."76 
72. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 
YALE L.J. 1281,  1 3 1 1  ( 1991)  (stating that "the l aw's privacy is  a sphere of sanctified 
isolation, impunity, and unaccountability"); McClain, supra note 70, at 209 (arguing 
that the private sphere of home and family can be a place of "rape, battery, and 
other exploitation"). 
73. See MacKinnon, supra note 72, at 1 3 1 1 ;  McClain, supra note 70, at 209.  
74. See, e .g. , Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 
( 1980); MacKinnon, supra note 72.  
75 .  See, e.g. , McClain,  supra note 70,  at 209-12 (exploring the feminist argument 
that the private sphere is  a sphere of subordination, abuse, and oppression) . 
76 .  See id. ; see also MacKinnon, supra note 72,  at 1 3 1 1  (arguing that "the doc-
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Feminist critics equate traditional ideas of privacy and private 
choice with (1 )  barriers to escaping confinement in traditional 
roles;77 and (2) ideals of isolation, independence, or individualism 
that conflict with the reality of the encumbered self78 and with 
ideals of ethical care, compassion, and community.79 Not all 
feminists , however, believe in the possibility of reconstructing 
privacy and private choice consistent with gender equality. 
When all is said and done, some feminists retain a decidedly 
negative stance toward privacy, professing the need to relegate 
privacy and private choice to the trash bin of outdated ideolo­
gy.
80 By contrast, I accept the basic feminist critique of privacy 
and private choice, but I also believe worthwhile,  egalitarian 
conceptions of privacy and private choice survive the criti que .81  
A. Overcoming Under-Participation 
Feminists exploded the assumption that the proper role of 
women is to live under the authority of men as daughters , 
wives, and mothers. The lives of American women once consisted 
chiefly of domestic tasks, such as cooking, shopping, gardening, 
cleaning, and childrearing. "Conventions of female chastity and 
modesty have shielded women in a mantle of privacy at a high 
cost to sexual choice and self-expression."82 Seclusion and subor-
trine of privacy has become the triumph of the state's abdication of women in the 
name of freedom and self-determination"). 
77. See McClain, supra note 70, at 209-10. 
78. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 20-21 (2d ed. 
1998). 
79. Cf ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 9 (1997) (discussing an "ethic of care" 
and the "act of caring" as traditionally private and separate from the public legal 
realm). 
80. See, e.g. , MacKinnon, supra note 12, at 93-102 (arguing that the liberal notion 
of privacy is outmoded and inconsistent with feminism); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking 
Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1016-28 ( 1984) (arguing that 
" [t]he rhetoric of privacy . . . reinforces a public/private dichotomy that is at the 
heart of the structures that perpetuate the powerlessness of women") . 
81. For a detailed discussion of egalitarian conceptions of privacy and private 
choice, see Anita Allen, Privacy, in A COMPANION TO FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 456-65 
(Alison M. Jaggar & Iris Marion Young eds., 1998) . 
82. Allen, supra note 1 ,  at 471. The good news is that expectations of emotional 
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dination meant that women generally were unable to utilize 
their full capacities to participate in society. Maternal and social 
roles kept women-who might otherwise have distinguished 
themselves in the public sphere as businesswomen,  scholars, 
government leaders, and artists-in the private sphere .83 To in­
crease women's participation in society, feminist activists have 
advocated for the right of women to hold property, to vote , and 
to work outside the home in jobs of varied description for which 
they would be compensated on an equal basis with men.84 
Women have under-participated in societal affairs . Although 
the under-participation critique is sweeping and true,  the cri­
tique does not suggest that women should not seek privacy, or 
eschew opportunities for personal privacy and private choice. 
Women today, especially educated and middle-class women, 
have lifestyle options that they can exercise with privacy-related 
interests in mind. Some of their options (e .g . ,  celibacy, childless­
ness) have a cost. Encouraging women to recognize their options, 
and to exercise their options in ways that acknowledge that 
women's privacy and private choice are worth something, would 
be an appropriate feminist emphasis. Educating oneself, delay­
ing marriage , controlling the timing of childbearing, working 
part-time-all of these are techniques women can use, and are 
using, to create lives in which they can enjoy forms and degrees 
of privacy unknown to American women fifty years ago. A felici­
tous balance between privacy and disclosure can come about if 
lessons about exploiting privacy and lessons about exploiting the 
new openness in public life are offered in tandem. Some femi­
nists seem to assume that privacy and disclosure are differing 
intimacy have fostered beneficial personal ties for women, and the domestic arts 
have reached high levels of excellence. 
83. See, e .g. , Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 1 1 0  HARV. L. REV. 
1657' 1672-73 ( 1997). 
84. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives 
From the Women's Movement, 6 1  N .Y.U. L. REV. 589, 624 ( 1986) (demonstratir; g 
that feminist activists have worked to enhance women's access to political and eco­
nomic opportunity by challenging laws that denied women the right to vote, to own 
property, and to work outside the home). 
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models of how one might live.85 Privacy and disclosure are better 
understood, however, as important and necessary dimensions of 
a range of good lives one can elect to live. 
B. Overcoming Violence 
Liberal society thrives on open government and closed person­
al relations. Feminists have stressed that closed personal rela­
tions make it more likely that serious harm will go undetected.86 
A parent-child relationship may involve sexual abuse or neglect; 
a marital relationship may involve beatings or rape .  Govern­
ment cannot protect vulnerable citizens from domestic violence if 
unbreachable boundaries of legally sanctioned privacy surround 
the family. The worthiness of the privacy ideal has been called 
into question in the United States, where problems of domestic 
violence suggest a need for more, rather than less, involvement 
in the traditionally "private" spheres of home and family life .87 It 
is no longer acceptable that men and women batter one anoth­
er-or that parents batter their children-in the name of anger 
or discipline. 
Domestic violence is a serious problem that additional eco­
nomic opportunities and civil rights for women appear not to 
have abated.88 Both substantive law and law enforcement prac­
tices need to reflect an understanding that households, no less 
than 3treet corners, can be places .of peril .  Our households are 
85 .  See, e .g. , MacKinnon, supra note 72, at 1 3 1 1 ;  Robin West, Reconstructing Lib­
e rty, 59 TENN. L.  REV. 441 ,  455-56, 458-61 ( 1 992) .  
86. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
87 .  See generally Carolyne R. Hathaway, Case Comment, Gender Based Discrimi­
nation in Police Reluctance to Respond to Domestic Assault Complaints, 75 GEO. L.J.  
667, 671 & n .20 ( 1986) (demonstrating that victims of domestic violence are almost 
always women and that the social, physical , and economic impact of such violence is 
severe); Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence ,  106 HARV. 
L. REV. 1501 ,  1501  ( 1993) [hereinafter Legal Responses to Domestic Violence ] ("By 
any standard, domestic violence must now be recognized as the most pressing social 
and legal problem in the United States. ") .  
88. See Legal Responses to Domestic Violence , supra note 87,  at 1 502-03 (noting 
the persistence of "stereotypes and misconceptions about domestic violence" that hin­
der the development of effective legal responses to domestic violence). 
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places of peril, but it does not follow that we perpetually ought 
to station agents of government in our living rooms, observing 
us and second-guessing every decision we make about our per­
sonal lives in the name of saving us from injury at home. \Ve do 
better with solutions to the problems of domestic violence that 
preserve conditions that afford opportunities for safe and mean­
ingful seclusion, intimacy, and decisionmaking. Battered wom­
en's shelters protect women by providing health services, s afe 
companionship, and privacy. It would be unfortunate indeed if 
the price women had to pay for escape from domestic abuse w as 
a life without opportunities for privacy. 
The U.S .  Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia estab­
lished the Domestic Violence Unit of the District of C olumbia 
local court system to provide expert response and adjudication of 
domestic violence charges and to help women cope with the so­
cial and economic consequences of abuse .89 This program and 
others like it compel women to relinquish seclusion and private 
information for the sake of prosecuting their assailants, but the 
program does not assume that daily lives lived in wholly ex­
posed settings are the ideal remedy for violence. The solution to 
domestic violence anci the DeShaney problem of public neglect of 
private violence90 is not to end families and seclusion,  but to 
make better use of evidence of chronic violence and imminent 
peril. The act of making better or different use of evidence re­
garding what occurs among family members and cohabitators is  
a way of  reconstructing privacy-redrawing lines of  public and 
private. The line between public and private already has been 
redrawn substantially in the criminal law of rape where, in 
many jurisdictions, "marital privacy" no longer immunizes mar­
ried men from prosecution for unconsensual sex with their wives. 9 1  
8 9 .  See Bill Miller, Team Created to Fight Domestic Violence, WASH. POST, Apr. 2 ,  
1996,  at C3.  
90 .  See generally DeShaney v .  Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs . ,  489 U.S.  
189  ( 1989) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment places no affirmative duty upon 
state government to protect its citizens). 
91 .  · See, e.g. , Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2 1 1 7 ,  2 163 n . 163 ( 1996).  
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C. Righting the Conservative Tilt 
Some feminists view the concept of privacy as having an in­
herently conservative tilt in the Western liberal societies where 
it has had the greatest currency.92 The privacy banner waves 
away beneficial public intervention calculated to reinvent cus­
tomary standards of behavior that lead to female under-partici­
pation and male aggression or harassment. Legal feminists com­
monly argue that the liberal ideology of "privacy" is inherently 
conservative and has slowed the growth of egalitarian laws ben­
eficial to vulnerable classes of women.93 Another argument pos­
its that a conservative ideology of privacy supports the notion 
that gays and lesbians belong, if at all , silent and repressed in 
the "closet. "94 
Conservatives generally have opposed government welfare 
programs, especially any that are amenable to characterization 
as inessential.95 It is perhaps not surprising, then, that they 
generally have opposed government funding for poor women's 
"elective" abortions .96 Many conservatives and liberals interpret 
the right to privacy, in the context of contraception and abortion, 
as a negative right against government decisionmaking respect­
ing procreation, not as a positive right to governmental pro-
92.  See generally Linda C .  McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L.  1 19 ,  1 50-72 ( 1 992) (examining feminist critiques of privacy). 
93 .  Cf Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Refe rence to 
Pornography, Abortion and Surrogacy) , 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31 ( 1992) (noting that 
"an abortion decision does not involve conventional privacy at all"). 
94. See, e .g. , Cathy A. Harris, Note, Outing Privacy Litigations: Toward a Contex­
tual Strategy for Lesbian and Gay Rights , 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 248, 268-69 
(1997) ("The claim of privacy becomes a trap for gays and lesbians . . .  which in 
turn perpetuates the[ir] oppression."). 
95. See, e .g. , Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in 
the Social We lfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361 ,  365 ( 1995) (noting the desire of 
conservatives to "contract" the scope of government aid to the disabled) ;  Kathleen A. 
Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All o( the People Some of the Time: 1990's Wel­
fare Reform and the Exploitation of American Values ,  4 VA. J.  Soc. POL 'y & L. 3, 
31 ( 1996) ("Welfare reform is obviously a rollback of social programs that have been 
described by conservatives for a decade as favoring 'special interests ."') .  
96 .  See Kelley P. Swift, Comment, Hope v.  Penates: Abortion Rights Under the 
Ne w York State Constitution, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1473,  1479 n.42 ( 1 995) .  
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grams designed to make contraception and abortion services 
available to those who cannot afford to pay.97 For some, it is  self­
evident as a matter of logic that a privacy right is not something 
for which the public should have to p ay. 
In the United States,  women won the right to obtain legal 
contraception and abortion in the 1960s and 1970s under the 
banner of "the right to privacy."98 M any feminists blame the em­
phasis on privacy in abortion law for the failure of legal efforts 
to secure government funding for poor women's abortions .99 Per­
haps it is no accident that equal protection, rather than privacy, 
is now apparently the more promising jurisprudential basis for 
advocating gay rights since the privacy debacle of Bowe rs v .  
Hardwick . 100 
In an attempt to reconceive public  and private, a number of 
feminists have argued that certain privacy rights for the poor 
entail public support . 101 These efforts strike me as exactly right. 
There is no need to concede the battle to liberalism's most con­
servative exponents. The liberal theorists who see the privacy 
case for abortion funding as doomed to fail because of the sup­
posed inherent conservative tilt of privacy rights talk lack the 
will to impose a new construction of privacy over the old concep­
tion of negative freedom. The idea that privacy is simply a nega­
tive liberty-a freedom from, as opposed to a claim to-can be 
challenged, and has been challenged, on its own terms. 102 
97.  See, e .g. , Allen, Proposed Equal Protection Fix, supra note 1 1 , at 444.  
98 .  See, e.g. , Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.  113 ( 1973) (holding that the right to privacy 
secured by the Constitution includes the right to abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S.  479 ( 1965) (using the right to privacy to hold that married individuals 
have the right to obtain legal contraception). 
99. See Allen, Proposed Equal Protection Fix, supra note 1 1  at 451-54.  
100 .  478 U.S .  186 ( 1986). But see Powell v .  State, No. S98A0755, 1998 WL 804568, 
at *7 (Ga. Nov. 23,  1 998) (declaring Georgia sodomy statute upheld in Bowers inval­
id under the Georgia Constitution). 
1 0 1 .  See, e .g. , Rachel N. Pine & Sylvia A. Law ,  Envisioning a Future for Reproduc­
tive Liberty: Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 27 HARV. C .R.-C . L. L. REV. 407,  
421  & nn.53-54 ( 1992). 
1 02 .  See, e .g. , id. ; Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v.  Sullivan and the Control of Knowl­
edge, 61 GEO. WASI-l. L.  REV. 587, 640-41 ( 1993). 
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D. Re scuing the Public and the Private 
Critics of liberalism are apt to insist that the public/private 
distinction is altogether an ideological tool of subordination in 
societies in which white men with property dominate other 
groups.  Feminists charge that privacy justifies exclusive monop­
olies over social resources as well as societal indifference to the 
violence and poverty that characterize the "private" lives of 
many women and children.103 The private sphere is permeated 
by government. The public sphere is ubiquitous . Law, and there­
fore the arms of "public" government, defines and mediates the 
complex entity-to-entity relations that constitute "private" life .  
For example, a person is permitted t o  drive a car, adopt a child, 
practice a religion, marry outside of her race, expect confidenti­
ality from physicians, belong to exclusive private clubs,  and use 
birth control pills, all because of legislative and constitutional 
provisions created and enforced by government. 104 Moreover, 
government serves essential policing and adjudicative functions 
without which personal privacy would be impossible for most 
people .  If someone is being harassed in certain ways that violate 
privacy, he or she can call the police . If someone harms anoth­
er's privacy interests , the harmed individual may be able to 
bring a lawsuit to have losses compensated. 
To the extent that government is infused with patriarchal, 
heterosexual ideals,  men's and women's privacy rights are likely 
to reflect patriarchal, heterosexual ideals of a private sphere . As 
a woman, "my" legal privacy is limited by "his" and "their" con­
ceptions of the good life .  Thus , a lesbian's desire to live in peace 
with her female lover and to adopt her lover's children may be 
thwarted by others' conceptions of the morally good family. 
Some liberals continue to speak of "the public" and "the pri­
vate" as if they were determinate, fixed categories constraining 
good government. One can argue, though still within the frame-
103. See, e.g. , MACKINNON, supra note 7 1 ,  at 193.  
104.  See ,  e .g. , CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4 (guaranteeing religious liberty); C ONN . GEN. 
STAT. ANN.  § 45a-724 (West 1998) (regulating adoption); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
90, § 8 (West 1 998) (regulating driver's licenses). 
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work of liberalism, that public and private are contingent, 
transformable conceptions of how power ought best to be allocat­
ed among individuals,  social groups, and government. It is not 
necessary to defend privacy and private choice on grounds that 
presuppose the existence of fixed, determinate, uncontestable 
Platonic realms . It is therefore not a devastating feminist chal­
lenge to observe that the public/private distinction is something 
of a myth. 
Feminist critiques of privacy leave the liberal conceptions of 
privacy and private choice very much alive . The longing for per­
sonal time and personal decisionmaking can linger long after the 
grip of patriarchy over women's bodies and lives is loosened. 
Feminists need not reject the language of public and private or 
the broad principles of inaccessibility, control, and decisional 
autonomy that undergird privacy rights. They do need to stress 
that the lines between public and private should be renegotiated 
and redrawn as necessary to further dignity, safety, and equali­
ty. Feminists have good reason to be critical of what the privacy 
of the private sphere has signified for women in the p ast and 
what the rhetoric and jurisprudence of privacy rights can signal 
for the future. At the same time, there is little doubt that wom­
en seeking greater control over their lives already have begun to 
benefit from heightened social respect for appropriate forms of 
physical , informational, proprietary, and decisional privacy. 
E. Fe minism, Libe ralism, and a Ne w Ge ne ration 
Liberal theory survives feminists' theoretical assessments of 
privacy, but I am less certain that liberal society or feminism 
can survive the demise of privacy as a preferred object of desire . 
Liberalism has taught that without privacy we are degraded, 
unfree, unhappy, untolerated/05 yet Jenni-the young woman 
who sells continual Je nniCam access to her apartment over the 
105. See generally Robin L. West, Libe ralism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition 
of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 ( 1 985) (exploring liberalism as an ide­
ology that defines privacy and autonomy as the good). 
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Internet-seems fine. Is Jenni fine? The answer depends in part 
on whether we are willing to judge Jenni on her own terms . No 
one is forcing her to appear on the Internet. She is collecting 
money by exploiting viewers who watch hoping to be titillated. 
She is not being exploited; she is not watched at all times 
and everywhere she goes. As a result, while her apartment is  
not strictly private, one must assume she gets some privacy 
somewhere, sometime. Madonna, we know, gets quite a bit of 
privacy. 106 
It is of particular interest to feminism that some women (like 
Jenni) have little taste for privacy. Thirty years ago, in the early 
days of the women's movement, women declared the personal to 
be political . 107 By 1990, women had begun implicitly to declare 
that the personal is commercial . 108 Put differently, women first 
reconstructed privacy by rejecting outmoded conceptions of do­
mesticity, modesty, reserve, and subordination to men; now they 
reconstruct privacy by exploiting it for income, celebrity, or both. 
Feminists are bound to split over the issues of self-exposure or 
objectification raised by Jenni and Madonna, the same way they 
split over issues of self-exposure or objectification raised by pros­
titution, pornography, and surrogate motherhood . 109 
If privacy is as important to the formation of personhood and 
political freedom as some liberal moral theorists have argued, 1 10 
106.  See Sischy, supra note 54, at 206. 
107. See,  e .g. , MACKINNON, supra note 7 1 ,  at 1 9 1 .  
108.  See generally Rosemary J.  Coombe, Authorizing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, 
Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365 
( 1 992) (examining the ways that commercialization and celebrity have altered privacy 
and produced engendered and endangered identities); Cheryl B .  Preston, Consuming 
Sexism: Pornography Suppression in the Larger Context of Commercial Images ,  3 1  
GA. L .  REV. 7 7 1 ,  840-52 ( 1997) (arguing that feminist attacks o n  privacy and advoca­
cy for the suppression of pornography are now giving way to advocacy for commer­
cial solutions). 
109 .  See generally Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Frame­
work for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343 (1995) (analyzing the effect of 
different legal frameworks on women and surrogate motherhood); Peter Halewood, 
Law's Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal Property Rights ,  81 IOWA 
L. REV. 1331  ( 1996) (examining the commodification and objectification of women in 
liberal thought and contemporary society). 
1 10.  See, e .g. , J. Braxton Craven, Jr. ,  Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone , 1976 
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we should be worried-feminists and nonfeminists alike-by the 
optional and challenged character taken on by personal privacy. 
Some valued forms of privacy are and should be optional. Some­
times giving up optional informational privacy is  a good thing, 
as when a guilty criminal freely decides to plead guilty rather 
than accept the protection of the Fifth Amendment to the U . S .  
Constitution. Adopting-or acceding to-a whole lifestyle pre­
mised on disclosure , however, ought not be an option.  For that 
reason, maybe we should be prepared to force people to have 
private lives and to live their private lives in private . Not, as in 
the past, so they can be kept in their place, but so that they can 
reap the full dignitarian and political consequences of privacy. 
Moralism? Snobbery? Classism? Civic republicanism? I think not. 
Liberals should continue to urge that, to the extent possible ,  
people must be free to exercise their j udgment and live in accord 
with their own visions of the good life .  We want government to 
be neutral, in the plausible way Dworkin suggested a number of 
years ago,m between competing conceptions of the good. A con­
ception of the good that permits privacy to be waived,  however, 
is  like a vision of the good that permits freedom to be w aived.  As 
liberals, we should not want people to sell all their freedom, 
and, as liberals, we should not want people to sell all their pri­
vacy and capacities for private choices. This is, in part, because 
the liberal conceptions of private choice as freedom from govern­
mental and other outside interference with decisionmaking 
closely link privacy and freedom. The liberal conception of pri­
vacy as freedom from unwanted disclosures,  publicity, and loss 
of control of personality also closely links privacy to freedom. I 
am not suggesting that Jenni should turn off her camera and 
sweep floors for her boyfriend, but I am suggesting that she 
DUKE L.J. 699 (arguing that the liberal concept of the right to be let alone can be 
secured with a recognition of a right to personhood); John Lawrence Hill ,  Mill, 
Fre ud, and Skinner: The Concept of the Self and the Moral Psychology of Liberty ,  
2 6  SETON HALL L .  REV. 92, 167-70 ( 1 995) (showing that the rise o f  liberalism and 
its requirement of personal freedom altered the formation of personhood and political 
liberty). 
1 1 1 .  See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 1 9 1  ( 1985). 
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should turn off her camera so that, free from the gaze of others, 
she can live a more genuinely expressive and independent life .  
I a m  also suggesting that regulatory measures aimed a t  curb­
ing the culture of exposure for the sake of "forcing" people to 
love privacy and live privately would be consistent with liberal 
values. 
IV. LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF THE GOOD 
In De mocracy 's Disconte nt,  Michael Sandel distinguishes be­
tween the "old" and the "new" privacy. 1 12 The old privacy, which 
he endorses, centers on home and family as reflections of an in­
dividual's identity . 1 13 Our privacy requires that government and 
fellow citizens let us alone to fulfill roles and responsibilities 
central to our identities and not necessarily of our own choosing. 
Custom, religion, and family obligate us in ways others ought to 
respect. The new privacy, which Sandel rejects, centers on au­
tonomous choices . 1 14 Under this vision, our privacy requires that 
government and fellow citizens let us alone to make important 
decisions and live in accordance with those decisions . 115 Sandel 
argues that the old privacy is historically and logically connected 
to the civic republican strand in American thought, while the 
new privacy is historically and logically connected to the liberal 
strand. 116 For Sandel, a core requirement of government is that 
it recognize that selves are thickly constituted by religion, cul­
ture, and family ties . 1 17 Individuals are obligated by identities 
and attachments to lifestyles of which others in society may dis­
approve . 1 18  
The version of liberalism to which I subscribe understands 
persons as shaped partly and substantially by social forces not of 
1 12 .  See SANDEL, supra note 14, at 94-100, 
1 13 .  See id. at 94-97 .  
1 14.  See id. a t  97-100.  
1 15.  See id. 
1 1 6 .  See id. at 94-100 .  
1 17.  See id. at  92.  
1 18 .  See id. 
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their own choosing, but also and importantly by their own choic­
es-their own decisions, commitments, and compromises.  Edu­
cation is  vital to the formation of persons who understand hu­
man capacities for choice and the limits of those capacities. Per­
sons are educated by families, schools, and religious institutions, 
and increasingly by exposure to television, radio, print media, 
films, and the Internet. The direct and indirect education they 
receive from these sources varies in content and intensity. Not 
all of what they learn contributes constructively and beneficially 
to liberalism's "formative project."119 
My conception of privacy (and private choice) is distinctly lib­
eral in its assumption that individuals are and should be well­
informed, morally autonomous choosers.  My conception is  also 
egalitarian and feminist in its assumption that a background of 
educational, economic, and sexual equality is a requirement of 
meaningful choice. In a just and liberal democracy, one's ability 
to choose how one shall live will be constrained through taxation 
and regulation so that others can achieve a comparable p alette 
of choices. The "old" civic republican conception of privacy rights 
as public recognition of obligations generated by encumbrances 
of identity120 may well have been what Warren and Brandeis 
had in mind. So much the worse for them. 12 1  Surely my privacy 
means more than that others should let me alone to be the best 
darn African-American, Methodist, suburban wife and mother I 
can be. Privacy is  also a matter of freedom to escape, rej ect, and 
modify such identities . I should be free to make and remake 
myself. 
Privacy is a matter of escaping as well as embracing encum­
brances of identity. \Vithout adequate privacy, there can be no 
1 19.  See William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Plural­
ism: Three Sources of Liberal Theory , 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 867 ( 1 999);  see also 
Michael J. Sandel, The Constitution of the Procedural Republic: Liberal Rights and 
Civic Virtues, 66 FORDHA..\1 L. REV. 1,  3 ( 1 997) (defining the "formative proj ect") . 
120 .  See SANDEL, supra note 78,  at 94-97 .  
121 .  See Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 1 0  N .  ILL. L.  
REV. 441 ( 1990) (examining feminist assessments of approaches to u nderstanding the 
value of privacy taken by the Warren and Brandeis article). 
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meaningful identities to embrace or escape, and no opportunities 
to engage in meaningful reflection, conversation, and debate 
about the grounds for embracing, escaping, and modifying par­
ticular identities . Undergirding the liberal democratic way of life 
will require public policies mindful of the cumulative threat to 
pnvacy. 
Government will have to intervene in private lives for the 
sake of privacy and values associated with it. Protecting privacy, 
however, rarely will require government to proscribe specific 
categories of conduct. The men who sunbathe in the nude on 
warm Sundays in Berlin's Tiergarten are as morally autonomous 
as their friends and neighbors who do not. 122 The threat to liber­
alism is not that individuals sometimes expose their naked bod­
ies in public places, display affection with same-sex partners in 
public, or broadcast personal information on national television. 
The threat to liberalism is that in an increasing variety of ways 
our lives are being emptied of privacy on a daily basis, especially 
physical and informational privacy. 
Government already, and with minimal controversy, interferes 
with individual privacy in the interest of protecting third parties 
or children from serious harm. In the near future, liberal gov­
ernment may have to proscribe and regulate disclosures and 
publications precisely in the interest of preventing cumulatively 
harmful diminutions of the taste for or the expectation of priva­
cy. So empowered, there is a risk that government will make 
mistakes and engage in discrimination. Proscribing breast-feed­
ing, while permitting men to go about bare-chested, is one exam­
ple of error and discrimination with which we are all familiar. 
Government could use its power to single out particular groups 
for repression, and one legitimately worries that public policies 
will penalize certain behaviors unfairly. Consider prohibitions 
against public displays of affection by same-sex partners and 
"Don't ask, Don't tell" policies.  Coercing privacy in the strong 
sense of dictating what people must always keep to themselves 
122.  See, e.g., James Woodall, 48 Hours in . . .  Berlin Worldwide, THE INDEPEN­
DENT (London), Aug. 15, 1998,  at 52, available in 1 998 WL 16745587.  
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and what they may disclose to others would threaten the liberal 
egalitarian ideal of tolerance. A plurality of notions and opportu­
nities for privacy must be permitted to flourish. 
When it comes to government, coercing privacy may be as 
much a matter of self-restraint as restraint of others. Govern­
ment's greater and greater ability to demand, access ,  and ma­
nipulate information about us contributes to the increasingly 
lowered expectations of privacy. It may also be a matter of reg­
ulating the corporate sector more aggressively, requiring fair 
information practices that give employees and consumers great­
er control over what information is collected and how it is used. 
Fear of a government misstep is  sometimes a reason for rec­
ommending government inaction. There is both empirical evi­
dence and normative philosophical argument supporting the 
proposition that paradigmatic forms of privacy (e .g . ,  seclusion, 
solitude, confidentiality, secrecy, anonymity) are vital to well-be­
ing. 123 It is not simply that people need opportunities for privacy; 
the point is that their well-being, and the well-being of the liber­
al way of life ,  requires that they in fact experience privacy. 
Coming up with public policies that are responsive to the ag­
gregation problem-the problem of many small privacy losses 
cumulating into a large overall loss-will require special cre­
ativity on the part of those responsible for making policy. It may 
require a mode of thinking environmental policy analysts engage 
in all the time, namely, broad, long-term multi-factored assess­
ments of costs, benefits and non-quantitative values. We ulti­
mately may need a national privacy "czar" to promote the ideal 
of policies and practices that encourage and protect essential 
forms of privacy without intolerance or undue paternalism. 
Suppose there is no efficient way to make public policy that is  
responsive to the aggregation problem because, for example, it  
would require mutual knowledge and coordination within a 
large and varied group of institutional actors. My observations 
about the importance of privacy to liberalism would hold, as a 
1 23 .  See supra note l l O  and accompanying text. 
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matter of principle, even if the transaction costs of regulatory 
approaches to "coercing privacy" are prohibitive in practice . 
Moreover, if we can do no better than to leave things precisely 
as they are, then the seriously liberal way of life is in j eopardy. I 
am hopeful that we can do at least a little better than leaving 
things as they are. My proposal is that public policymakers be­
gin to take account of the cumulative effects of eroding privacy 
tastes and expectations, and weigh the risks of either doing 
something or doing nothing. I do not pretend that this Essay has 
answered all of the questions it raises.  We are very much at the 
beginning, not the end, of a fresh line of thinking about privacy, 
culture, and regulative norms . 
